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Introduction 
With the decline in privately and publicly guaranteed 
benefits for pensions and health care, people increas-
ingly must finance a greater share of their retirement 
expenses through their own savings.  The relatively 
high long-term return on equity makes investments 
in stocks seem both an attractive and suitable means 
of accumulating the substantial wealth that savers will 
require.  Yet, the 50 percent drop in the Standard & 
Poor’s 500 Index from May 2008 to March 2009 is 
only the latest reminder that stocks pose considerable 
risk for investors.  In the past, equity returns over pe-
riods as long as 10 or 20 years have diverged substan-
tially from their long-term averages, tarnishing the 
appeal of stocks even as investments for the long run.
This brief analyzes the risk in stocks, partitioning 
it into two components.  The first reflects the growth 
of economic activity and corporate earnings.  The 
second reflects the way investors value those earn-
ings.  This analysis finds that variations in business 
activity and profits – the first component – account 
for a relatively small share of the risk in stocks over 
holding periods as long as 10 years.  Instead, varia-
tions in shareholders’ valuation of earnings account 
for most of the volatility of returns.  This brief also 
finds that the risk attributed to valuations of earnings 
tends to diminish over investment horizons as long as 
40 years or more, because the value of stocks broadly 
follows the trend in GDP and corporate profits.  
Although stocks are better investments for the very 
long run, these periods can seem too long to suit sav-
ers who lack the capacity or the willingness to absorb 
significant financial risks in the interim.
This brief is the first in a series that will examine 
the potential role of stocks as long-term investments 
for savers.  Future briefs will analyze the outlook for 
the long-run return on stocks and the stability of 
those returns and examine ways of exploiting the 
long-run behavior of stock prices to offer savers attrac-
tive blends of returns and risks on their long-term 
investments.
The first section of this brief reviews the recent 
history of returns on equity.  The second section notes 
that the market value of equity has tended to follow 
the trend in GDP since the 1940s.  The waves of the 
market value of equity around this trend reflect varia-
tions in corporate earnings relative to GDP and varia-
tions in the market’s pricing of earnings.  The third 
section shows that variations in corporate earnings 
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Figure 1. GDP and Value of Corporations’ Marketable Securities, 1950-2009 Q1
are relatively small over holding periods as long as 10 
years and that most of the risk in stocks arises from 
the way the market values these earnings.  The final 
section concludes.
The Historical Record
Stocks are risky investments.  Their real returns, 
which are highly volatile over short holding periods, 
also vary substantially over periods longer than a 
decade.  We commonly measure the variability of 
returns by their standard deviation. A low standard 
deviation shows that returns do not range very far 
from their average value, while a high standard devia-
tion shows that returns can extend over a large range 
of values.  From 1949 to 2008, the average annual 
real rate of return on stocks was 7.2 percent (see Table 
1).  The standard deviation of annual returns was 18.2 
percentage points.
Stockholders expect adequate compensation for 
bearing this risk.  Accordingly, the gap between the 
annual return on stocks and bonds has averaged 3.8 
percentage points since 1872, and 5 percentage points 
since 1949.1  Some investors try to harvest this at-
tractive premium by attempting to dilute the risk in 
stocks through buy-and-hold investment strategies, 
expecting the low and high outcomes eventually to 
“average out.”2
Table 1. Annual Real Returns on Market 
Securities, 1872-2008
Sources: Global Financial Data (2009); Ibbotson Associates 
(2009); and U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (2009).
Years
1872-2008 6.1 19.1 2.3 8.4
1949-2008 7.2 18.2 2.2 9.9
1949-1958 17.9 19.9 -0.5 4.6
1959-1968 7.8 13.1 0.6 4.4
1969-1978 -3.3 19.6 -1.4 8.5
1979-1988 11.0 13.1 5.0 17.7
1989-1998 15.6 14.9 7.4 9.6
1999-2008 -3.8 19.6 2.2 6.9
Average 
return
% % % %
Average 
return
Std. dev. Std. dev.
Equities Bonds
The historical record, however, shows that the risk 
in stocks is not so easily tamed.  Although the varia-
tion of average annual returns diminishes over 10-
year holding periods, it subsides too little to suggest 
that high and low annual returns offset each other 
very effectively (see Table 1).3
 
Note: The data in this figure use a log scale.
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Anchors for Stock Prices
Stock prices respond both to prevailing economic con-
ditions and to perceptions of future conditions.  Con-
sequently, both the average rate of appreciation and 
the variation of stock prices shift as economic condi-
tions change, sometimes by considerable amounts.4  
During economic booms and busts, periods of large 
changes in business activity, companies’ earnings, 
and stockholders’ expectations of future earnings can 
push the average rate of appreciation of equity well 
away from its historical average.  At the same time, 
the volatility of earnings often changes significantly 
for intervals spanning many years.  As a result of 
these shifts, investors cannot reliably expect high and 
low returns to “average out” over holding periods even 
as long as a decade.5
Just as economic conditions disturb stock prices, 
they also eventually help anchor stock prices.  After 
booms and busts in business activity run their course, 
earnings and expectations of future earnings return 
to trends defined by potential GDP.  This mean 
reversion in economic conditions and earnings also 
influences the value of equity, drawing the total value 
of stocks to a trend defined by GDP (see Figure 1).6  
The large divergences that emerged during the energy 
crisis of the 1970s and during the two bull markets of 
the last 10 years ended as the value of stocks moved 
back toward their average relationship to GDP.  
The Value of Equity and GDP
The correspondence between the value of stocks and 
GDP is more than a statistical artifact.  The value of 
nonfinancial corporations’ stocks relative to GDP can 
be expressed as the product of two ratios: the market 
value of their stock (MV) relative to their earnings (E), 
and their earnings relative to GDP.7
 
The tie between the value of stocks and GDP conse-
quently depends on the strength of the tie between 
market values and earnings – the valuation ratio – and 
on the strength of the tie between earnings and GDP 
– the earnings ratio.  The discussion that follows will 
cover the earnings ratio first.
The Earnings Ratio
The earnings of nonfinancial corporations move 
relatively closely with GDP because these corporations 
account for a relatively stable share of GDP and the 
division of output between the compensation of labor 
and the compensation of capital for these companies 
has not varied substantially.  The output of nonfinan-
cial corporations has consistently accounted for just 
over half of GDP.8  Since the early 1950s, the earnings 
of nonfinancial corporations have mostly ranged from 








Figure 2. Earnings of Nonfinancial 
Corporations as a Percent of GDP, 1952-2009 Q1
Sources: U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
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Whenever earnings have deviated very much from 
this range, they have tended to return to it within a 
few years.  This reversion to mean reflects a negative 
correlation between the growth of corporations’ as-
sets and their return on assets.9  When corporations’ 
assets rise or fall much more rapidly than GDP, their 
rate of return on assets typically moves in the opposite 
direction.  This negative correlation helped to stabilize 
the earnings ratio over longer horizons by regulating 
corporations’ rate of expansion.  When their net assets 
expanded faster than GDP, for instance, the falling 
rate of return on their assets eventually encouraged 
companies to reduce their capital budgets.  As their 
rate of expansion fell, their net assets and their output 
fell back to their historical correspondence to GDP, 







The valuation ratio, the first factor in the equation 
above, also has been anchored, albeit with a longer 
and more elastic tether.  The ratio of market values 
to earnings has been more volatile than the ratio of 
earnings to GDP, and the deviations of valuations 
from average have tended to last longer than those 
for earnings.  From 1950 to 1990, the volatility of the 
valuation ratio was one and a half times the volatility 
of the earnings ratio; after 1990, the valuation ratio 
was twice as volatile as the earnings ratio.
The valuation ratio depends on the return that 
shareholders require of stocks, companies’ earnings, 
the outlook for future earnings, and shareholders’ 
perception of risk, among other factors.10  When earn-
ings surge unexpectedly, often accompanied by the 
adoption of new products or technologies, ratios of 
market values to earnings can rise as shareholders 
become especially optimistic about the prospects for 
earnings.  No laws of gravity quickly pull valuations 
back to their mean.11  During the early 1990s, for 
example, corporate profits rose strongly and the out-
look for future earnings in the communications and 
technology sectors looked especially bright.  Although 
corporate profits peaked in 1997, valuations rose for 
the remainder of the decade supported by forecasts 
of renewed growth and expectations of substantial 
capital gains to come.
The valuation ratio eventually tends to return to 
its long-run average.  After rising significantly during 
the bull market of the 1990s, the wave of optimistic 
valuations ended once earnings fell below trend, 
economic activity decelerated, and profits in the com-
munications and technology sectors collapsed.  In 
time, shareholders came to appreciate the tie between 
companies’ capacity to generate profits and GDP. 
 
We Have Met the Enemy, and It Is Us
Shareholders’ reactions to economic conditions and to 
recent trends in stock prices create most of the volatil-
ity in the returns on equity.  Although stock prices 
vary substantially in response to cycles in business 
activity and earnings, these factors account for a small 
share of the risk in stocks over holding periods as 
long as 10 years or more.  
The equation described on the previous page, 
shows a trend line, defined by GDP, for the total 
market value of equity.  As shown in Figure 3, if the 
earnings and valuation ratios always equaled their 
long-run averages, the total value of stocks would 
move in lockstep with GDP (light gray line).  Along 
this trend, the average rate of growth of the value of 
stock equals that of GDP. Of course, the earnings and 
valuation ratios are not constant.  Economic cycles 
bring large variations in earnings, which contrib-
ute to the volatility of stock prices. If fluctuations in 
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Figure 3. Valuation of Equity for Nonfinancial Corporations, 1952-2009 Q1
Note: The data in this figure use a log scale.
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earnings were the sole cause of variations in stock 
prices, these prices would be depicted by the black 
line, which assumes only the valuation ratio remains 
constant.  Instead, the actual path of equity values is 
depicted by the dashed line.  The gaps between the 
black and dashed lines are due to large and lasting 
changes in the valuation ratio, which allow stocks to 
become substantially unhinged from corporations’ 
ability to generate earnings.12
 
Conclusion
Stocks are risky investments partly because economic 
conditions vary in ways that we cannot fully predict.  
But this volatility in fundamental conditions accounts 
for a small share of the risk in stocks over investment 
horizons as long as 10 or 20 years.  Most of this risk 
derives from the way shareholders react to their un-
certainty about economic conditions, form opinions 
about the future, and manage their portfolios.
Over very long investment horizons, covering 40 
years or more, the returns on stocks reflect economic 
fundamentals more consistently.  Since the 1940s, the 
value of corporate equity has grown with GDP and 
corporate profits.  As a result of these ties, the real 
rate of return on stocks over the last sixty years closely 
matches the growth of real GDP plus the dividend 
yield on stocks.
While the historical record shows that variations 
in the economy’s potential rate of growth and re-
turn on capital have been relatively small over long 
intervals, these intervals can be too long to provide 
much assurance to investors.  Furthermore, even 
over the very long term, shareholders bear the risk 
that the growth of potential GDP or the returns on 
companies’ capital might deviate significantly from 
past experience.  Nevertheless, the long-term risk has 
been limited compared with that in annual and 10-
year returns, suggesting that, with intergenerational 
programs for sharing risk, equity retains considerable 
promise for helping savers meet their objectives for 
building wealth for retirement.
Endnotes
1  Arnott (2009) and Arnott and Berstein (2002) 
contend that this equity premium has been smaller, 
perhaps not even positive.
2  See Siegel (2008). Although the standard deviation 
of the average return on stocks falls with time, the 
standard deviation of wealth rises.  This is the fallacy 
of time diversification discussed by Samuelson (1963) 
and Bodie (1995).  Those who find stocks too risky 
for the short run also should find them too risky for 
the long run, unless their prices revert to a trend.  See 
also Liu and Colman (2009) regarding the effect of 
repeated choices on investors’ aversion to loss and 
ambiguity.
3  If returns are independently, identically distributed 
random variables, then the standard deviation of 
the average return for n periods equals the standard 
deviation for one period divided by the square root 
of n.  Consequently, the standard deviation of annual 
returns from 1949 to 2008, 18.2 percentage points, 
implies that the standard deviation of average re-
turns for 10-year intervals should be 5.8 percentage 
points if annual returns are identically, independently 
distributed.  But the standard deviation of the average 
returns for the six decades, 9.3 percentage points, is 
almost twice this result.
4  As a result, analysis has resorted to autoregres-
sions, assumptions of heteroscedasticity, Levy 
distributions, jump-diffusions, fractal models, chaos 
theory, and a variety of other techniques to describe 
the behavior of returns instead of the venerable 
random walk.  For example, see Hull (2008); Calvet 
and Fischer (2002); Bouchaud (2005); and Gatheral 
(2006).
5  When investors become more uncertain about 
future returns as a result of changing business condi-
tions, the risk in forecasts and, therefore, the variation 
in valuations which depend on the risk in forecasts 
can exceed the variation in historical returns (Pastor 
and Stambaugh 2009).
6  In other words, the market capitalization of corpo-
rations, GDP, and corporate earnings are cointegrated 
with error correction.Center for Retirement Research 6
7  The market value of equity for nonfinancial corpo-
rations is reported in the Federal Reserve’s Flow of 
Funds Accounts (2009), Table L.102.  Earnings equal 
the sum of three components:  1) nonfinancial corpo-
rations’ profits after tax with IVA and CCAdj, National 
Income and Product Accounts (2009), Table 1.14; 2) 
the rate of change in the business output deflator, 
National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.3.4, 
times the net credit market liabilities of nonfinancial 
corporations; and 3) foreign earnings retained abroad, 
Flow of Funds, Table F.102.
8  The output of nonfinancial corporations represents 
about 70 percent of business output, which accounts 
for about three-quarters of GDP.  The remainder 
of GDP represents the value of output attributed to 
households, nonprofit institutions, and general gov-
ernment (National Income and Product Accounts, Table 
1.3.5).  Figure 1 shows that the value of equity for all 
corporations, financial plus nonfinancial, generally 
moves in concert with that of nonfinancial corpora-
tions alone.  
About one-quarter of the output of nonfinancial 
corporations has represented the compensation of 
capital – earnings plus interest paid to creditors plus 
capital consumption expenses – and earnings after 
taxes have accounted for about one-third of capital’s 
compensation, about 8 percent of nonfinancial corpo-
rations’ output.  The dominant component of earn-
ings is profits after tax.  From the National Income and 
Product Accounts, Table 1.14, capital’s share equals the 
sum of net operating surplus and capital consump-
tion divided by gross value added ((lines 24+18) / line 
17).  Earnings’ share of the compensation of capital 
equals profits after tax with IVA and CCAdj divided 
by the sum of net operating surplus and capital 
consumption (line 29 / (lines 24+18)).  And earn-
ings’ share of output is profits after tax with IVA and 
CCAdj divided by gross value added (line 29 / line 
17).  The data cited reflect averages of these ratios for 
annual data, 1950 to 2008.  This stability in capital’s 
share of output provides the foundation for the time-
tested Cobb-Douglas production function, much of 
the macroeconomic analysis of potential GDP, and 
the pricing of capital and labor inputs in equilibrium 
(Romer 2001).
9  This negative correlation, -0.7, is consistent with 
diminishing returns to capital in production 
functions.  
10  Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (2008); Kopcke and 
Rutledge (2004); and Kopcke (2005).
11  MacKay (2009); Chancellor (2000); Kindleberger 
(2000); and Akerlof and Shiller (2009).
12  See Appendix Table for more detailed data on the 
contributions of earnings and valuations to equity 
values over time.Issue in Brief 7
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 APPENDIXAppendix Table. Annual Nominal Appreciation on Equity of Nonfinancial Corporations: 
Contribution of Earnings and Valuations
Sources: U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009); and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2009).
Year
1949-2008 6.8 3.5 6.9 20.7 8.0 17.4
1949-1958 5.8 5.9 4.0 20.2 13.2 14.8
1959-1968 6.8 2.4 8.5 9.6 10.0 12.4
1969-1978 9.9 2.7 8.2 31.1 0.2 22.4
1979-1988 8.1 2.4 8.9 18.9 11.6 12.8
1989-1998 5.5 0.9 6.2 9.2 15.7 14.5
1999-2008 4.7 1.8 5.8 29.3 -1.1 22.8
Trend value: constant earnings 
ratio and valuation ratio
Derived value: constant 
valuation ratio
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The volatility of stock prices can be attributed to GDP, earnings, and valuations.  If both the earnings and valu-
ation ratios were constant, stock prices would vary only with GDP.  In this case, the standard deviation for the 
annual appreciation of stock prices would have been only 3.5 percent from 1949 to 2008 (column 2).  And, the 
average appreciation of stock prices would have been relatively stable during each of the six distinct decades 
since 1949 (column 1).
If the valuation ratio alone were constant, stock prices would reflect the volatility of annual earnings.  Be-
cause annual earnings varied much more than GDP, the standard deviation of annual stock prices in this case, 
20.7 percent, is much greater than in the previous case (column 4 versus column 2).  Yet, because earnings re-
verted to trend relatively quickly and consistently, the annual variations of stock prices based on earnings would 
have largely “averaged out” in each of the six distinct decades since 1949 (column 3).  The volatility of these 
10-year average rates of appreciation matches that of stock prices based on GDP (column 1).
Actual annual stock prices are nearly as volatile as those derived in the previous case (column 6 versus col-
umn 4).  But, the actual average rates of appreciation of stocks in each of the six distinct decades since 1949 are 
much more volatile than those derived in the previous cases (column 5 versus columns 1 and 3).  This greater 
volatility reflects large and lasting variations in the valuation ratio rather than variations in GDP and earnings.
The annual volatility of stock prices that incorporates the variation in the earnings ratio (column 4) is gener-
ally greater than the annual volatility of stock prices that incorporates the net variation in both the earnings and 
valuation ratios.  Even though the valuation ratio is more volatile than the earnings ratio, the annual percentage 
change in the valuation ratio is negatively correlated with the annual percentage change in the earnings ratio.  
As a result of this negative correlation, annual variations in the valuation ratio tend to offset a portion of the 
annual variations in the earnings ratio.  Over periods longer than a year, this correlation between valuation and 
earnings ratios drops to zero.  As earnings revert to trend relatively quickly, the persistent changes in valuations 
account for most of the variation in the average appreciation rates of stocks over periods as long as 10 years.About the Center
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